introduced and accepted on a considerable scale. It is not identical, therefore, with this process of modernization as a whole,2 but it deals with one of its major aspects, or better, with a recurrent cluster among its consequences. These consequences, once they occur on a substantial scale, influence in turn the further process of modernization. Thus, what can be treated for a short time span as a consequence of the modernization process, appears over a longer period as one of its continuing aspects and as a significant cause, in the well known pattern of feedback or circular causation.
Viewed over a longer time perspective, such a life of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy, and moving into a different life or broader and deeper involvement in the vast complexities of modern life, including potential and actual involvement in mass politics. It is a task of political theory to make this image more specific; to bring it into a form in which it can be verified by evidence; and to develop the problem to a point where the question "how?" can be supplemented usefully by the question "how much?" In its intuitive form, the concept of social mobilization already carried with it some images of growing numbers and rising curves. In so far as the constituent processes of social mobilization can be measured and described quantitatively in terms of such curves, it may be interesting to learn how fast the curves rise, whether they show any turning points, or whether they cross any thresholds beyond which the processes they depict have different side effects from those that went before. Notable among these side effects are any that bear on the performance of political systems and upon the stability and capabilities of governments.5
I. AN ANALYTICAL FORMULATION
Let 111 stand for the generalized process of social mobilization, and let us think of it as representing the general propensity or availability of persons for recommitment. In this sense, 111 could be measured by the average probability that any person, say between fifteen and sixty-five years old, would have undergone, or could be expected to undergo during his lifetime, a substantial change from old ways of living to new ones.
In order to define this change more precisely, it is necessary to make three assumptions: (1) there are different forms of social recommitment relevant for politics; (2) these forms tend to be associated with each other; and (3) these forms tend to reinforce each other in their effects. Two further points may be noted for investigation: (4) each of these forms may have a threshold at which some of its effects may change substantially; and (5) some or all of these thresholds, though not identical in quantitative terms, may be significantly related to each other.
For these constituent processes of social mobilization we may then choose the symbols , Mnt. Thus we may call ml the exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, installations, consumer goods, show windows, rumor, governmental, medical or military practices, as well as through mass media of communication. Then M2 may stand for a narrower concept, exposure to these mass media alone. And m,3 may stand for change of residence; M4 for urbanization; m5 for change from agricultural occupations; in6 for literacy; M7 for per capita income; and so on. Our ml could then stand for the percentage of the population that had been exposed in any substantial way to significant aspects of modern life; M2 for the percentage of those exposed to mass media, i.e., the mass media audience; mi3 for the percentage of the inhabitants who have changed their locality of residence (or their district, province or state); m4 for the percentage of the total population living in towns; m5 for the percentage of those in nonagricultural occupations among the total of those gainfully occupied; M6 for the percentage of literates; M7 could be measured simply by net national product, or alternatively by gross national product in dollars per capita. At this stage in the compilation of evidence the exact choice of indicators and definition must be considerably influenced by the availability of statistical data. In many cases it may be most satisfactory to use the data and definitions published by the United Nations, in such volumes as the United Nations Demographic Year Book, the United Nations World Social Survey, the United Nations Statistical Year Book, and a host of more specialized UN pub- lications.6 In a modern, highly developed and fully mobilized country M7 should be above $600 gross national product per capita; ml, M2, and m6 should all be well above 90 per cent; m4 and M5 should be above 50 per cent, even in countries producing large agricultural surpluses beyond their domestic consumption; and even m3, the change of residence, seems to be higher than 50 per cent in such a country as the United States. In an extremely underdeveloped country, such as Ethiopia, mn7 is well below $100 and the remaining indicators may be near 5 per cent or even lower.
In the course of economic development, as countries are becoming somewhat less like Ethiopia and somewhat more like the United States, all these indicators tend to change in the same direction, even though they do not change at the same rate. They exhibit therefore to some extent a characteristic which Paul Lazarsfeld has termed the "interchangeability of indicators"; if one (or even several) of these indicators should be missing it could be replaced in many cases by the remaining ones, or by other indicators similarly chosen, and the general level and direction of the underlying social process would still remain clear.7 This characteristic holds, however, only as a first approximation. The lags and discrepancies between the different indicators can reveal much of interest to the student of politics, and some of these discrepancies will be discussed below.
The first and main thing about social mobilization is, however, that it does assume a single underlying process of which particular indicators represent only particular aspects; that these indicators are correlated and to a limited extent interchangeable; and that this complex of processes of social change is significantly correlated with major changes in politics.
The overall index of social mobilization, M, is a second order index; it measures the correlation between the first order indices mi * m, . It should express, furthermore, the probability that the (n+ 1)th index will be similarly correlated with its predecessors, regardless of how large a number n might be, provided only that the index itself was appropriately chosen. Differently put, to assert that social mobilization is a "real" process, at certain times and in certain countries, is to assert that there exists for these cases a large and potentially unlimited number of possible measurements and indicators, all correlated with each other and testifying by their number and by the strength of their correlation to the reality of the underlying phenomenon.
In limited, and ordinarily there should be no need to compile for any particular time and country even all those data that could be found. On the contrary, one's usual aim will be economy: to get the greatest amount of useful information from the smallest body of data. The seven indicators of social mobilization listed above as mi to m7 should quite suffice, in most cases, to give a fairly good first picture of the situation. They were chosen in part on grounds of availability and convenience, but also because they are less closely correlated, and hence less completely interchangeable, than some other indices might be.
Each of the seven processes chosen could itself be measured by several different indicators, but in each case these subindicators are apt to be very closely correlated and almost completely interchangeable. Literacy, for instance, can be measured as a percentage of the population above fifteen or above ten, or above seven years of age; it could be defined as the ability to recognize a few words, or to read consecutively, or to write. Each of these particular definitions would yield a different numerical answer, but so long as the same definition was used for each country, or for each period within the same country, each of these yardsticks would reveal much the same state of affairs. If applied to Morocco between 1920 and 1950, e.g., each of these tests would have shown how the number of literate Moroccans began to outgrow the number of literate Frenchmen in that country, with obvious implications for its political future.
Similarly, urbanization could be measured in terms of the population of all localities of more than 2,000 or more than 5,000, or more than 20,000 or 50,000 inhabitants; or it could be measured, less satisfactorily, in terms of the population of all those localities that had a charter or a city form of government. Each of these criteria of measurement would have revealed the same process of large-scale urban growth in Finland between 1870 and 1920, for instance, or in India between 1900 and 1940, which had such far-reaching effects on political life in these countries. A recent unpublished study by Frederick E. Tibbetts 3d suggests once again the close interchangeability of differenct indicators of urban growth in Canada, as they bear upon the problems of assimilation and differentiation among the French-speaking and English-speaking population of that country. Urbanization, Tibbetts finds, has outstripped in recent decades the learning of English among French-Canadians; he finds among urban residents, and generally in nonagricultural occupations, a growing number of persons who speak no other language but French. The political significance of this development, which was largely concentrated in the province of Quebec, is highlighted by his observation that in 1951 Quebec (omitting Montreal), with 21 per cent of the total population of Canada, had only 4 and 7 per cent, respectively, of the veterans of World Wars I and II.8
Among the seven major indicators of social mobilization proposed in this paper, the correlations between economic development and literacy are less complete and the discrepancies more revealing. Ethiopia and Burma both have per capita gross national products of about $50, but Ethiopia has less than 5 per cent literates and is politically stable; Burma reports over 45 per cent literates and is not.la Of the states of India, Kerala, with one of the highest rates of literacy, elected a Communist government in the late 1950s.
It may thus be useful to seek answers to two kinds of questions: (1) how good is the correlation between the seven main indicators and (2) how interesting are the variant cases? As regards the first question, it has already been pointed out that the numerical values of the seven main indicators will not be identical. However it we think of each of these indicators as forming a separate scale, on which each country could rank anywhere from, say, the top fifth to the bottom fifth, then we could measure the extent to which the rankings of a country on each of these indicator scales are correlated. From general impressions of the data, I should surmise that these rank order correlations should have coefficients of correlation of about 0.6 to 0.8, accounting on the average for perhaps one-half of the observed variation. As regards the second question, each of the cases showing substantial discrepancies between some of the main indicators will have to be studied separately, but the examples of Burma and Kerala, just mentioned, suggest that such cases may well repay investigation, and that the comparison of indicators may serve political scientists as a crude but perhaps useful research device.
For a somewhat more refined study the no- tioii of two thresholds may be introduced. The first of these is the threshold of significance, S, that is, the numerical value below which no significant departure from the customary workings of a traditional society can be detected and no significant disturbance appears to be created in its unchanged functioning. For each of the particular indicators, mi through M7, we should expect to find a corresponding particular threshold of significance, si through S7; and our concept of social mobilization should imply that, once several major indicators move to or beyond this threshold of significance, the remaining indicators should also be at or above their respective levels of significance. The probability that this will be in fact Much of what has been said thus far may be summarized in concise notation. If we write P as the conventional symbol for probability, Ms as the symbol for the overall process of social mobilization in regard to the thresholds of significance, and MO as the symbol for the same process in regard to the thresholds of criticality, then we may write the general concept of social mobilization briefly as follows:
(1) Ms= P (if mn <?s, then m+l <sn+l) or briefly, None of these shorthand formulas should require further comment here. They merely summarize what has been said at greater length in the preceding pages. Readers who find such formulations uncongenial may skip them, therefore, without loss, so long as they have followed the verbal argument.
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT
In whatever country it occurs, social mobilization brings with it an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population. These politically relevant strata are a broader group than the elite: they include all those persons who must be taken into account in politics. Dock workers and trade union members in Ghana, Nigeria, or the United States, for instance, are not necessarily members of the elites of these countries, but they are quite likely to count for something in their political life. In the developing countries of Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America, the political process usually does not include the mass of isolated, subsistence-farming, tradition-bound and politically apathetic villagers, but it does include increasingly the growing numbers of city dwellers, market farmers, users of money, wage earners, radio listeners and literates in town and country. The growth in the numbers of these people produces mounting pressures for the transformation of political practices and institutions; and since this future growth can be estimated at least to some extent on the basis of trends and data from the recent past, some of the expectable growth in political pressures-we may call it the potential level of political tensions-can likewise be estimated.
Soeial mobilization also brings about a change in the quality of politics, by changing the range of human needs that impinge upon the political process. As people are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old habits and traditions, and often from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic changes in their needs. They may now come to need provisions for housing and employment, for social security against illness and old age, for medical care against the health hazards of their crowded new dwellings and places of work and the risk of accidents with unfamiliar machinery. They may need succor against the risks of cyclical or seasonal unemployment, against oppressive charges of rent or interest, and against sharp fluctuations in the prices of the main commodities which they must sell or buy. They need instruction for themselves and education for their children. They need, in short, a wide range and large amounts of new government services.
These needs ordinarily cannot be met by traditional types of government, inherited from a precommercial and preindustrial age. Maharajahs, sultans, sheikhs and chieftains all are quite unlikely to cope with these new problems, and traditional rule by land-owning oligarchies or long established religious bodies most often is apt to prove equally disappointing in the face of the new needs. Most of the attempts to change the characteristics of the traditional ruling families-perhaps by supplying them with foreign advisers or by having their children study in some foreign country-are likely to remain superficial in their effects, overshadowed by mountings pressures for more thoroughgoing changes.
In developing countries of today, however, the increasingly ineffective and unpopular traditional authorities cannot be replaced successfully by their historic successors in the Western world, the classic institutions of 18th and 19th century liberalism and laissez-faire. For the uprooted, impoverished and disoriented masses produced by social mobilization, it is surely untrue that that government is best that governs least. They are far more likely to need a direct transition from traditional government to the essentials of a modern welfare state. The developing countries of Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America may have to accomplish, therefore, within a few decades a process of political change which in the history of Western Europe and North America took at least as many generations; and they may have to accomplish this accelerated change almost in the manner of a jump, omitting as impractical some of the historic stages of transition through a period of near laissez-faire that occurred in the West.
The growing need for new and old government services usually implies persistent political pressures for an increased scope of government and a greater relative size of the government sector in the national economy. In the mid-1950s, the total government budget--national, regional and local-tended to amount to roughly 10 per cent of the gross national product in the very poor and poorly mobilized countries with annual per capita gross national products at or below $100. For highly developed and highly mobilized countries, such as those with per capita gross national products at or above $900, the corresponding proportion of the total government sector was about 30 per cent. If one drew only the crudest and most provisional inference from these figures, one might expect something like a 2.5 per cent shift of national income into the government sector for every $100 gain in per capita gross national product in the course of economic development. It might be more plausible, however, to expect a somewhat more rapid expansion of the government sector during the earlier stages of economic development, but the elucidation of this entire problem-with all its obvious political implications-would require and reward a great deal more research.
The relationship between the total process of social mobilization and the growth of the national income, it should be recalled here, is by no means symmetrical. Sustained income growth is very unlikely without social mobilization, but a good deal of social mobilization may be going on even in the absence of per capita income growth, such as occurs in countries with poor resources or investment policies, and with rapid population growth. In such cases, social mobilization still would generate pressures for an expansion of government services and hence of the government sector, even in a relatively stagnant or conceivably retrograde economy. Stopping or reversing in such cases the expansion of government or the process of social mobilization behind it-even if this could be done--hardly would make matters much better. The more attractive course for such countries might rather be to use the capabilities of their expanding governments so as to bring about improvements in their resources and investment policies, and an eventual resumption of economic growth. To what extent this has been, or could be, brought about in cases of this kind, would make another fascinating topic for study. The figures just given apply, of course, only to non-Communist countries; the inclusion of Communist states would make the average in each class of government sectors higher. It would be interesting to investigate, however, whether and to what extent the tendency toward the relative expansion of the government sector in the course of social mobilization applies also, mutatis mutandis, to the Communist countries.
A greater scope of governmental services and functions requires ordinarily an increase in the capabilities of government. Usually it requires an increase in the numbers and training of governmental personnel, an increase in governmental offices and institutions, and a significant improvement in administrative organization and efficiency. A rapid process of social mobilization thus tends to generate major pressures for political and administrative reform. Such reforms may include notably both a quantitative expansion of the bureaucracy and its qualitative improvement in the direction of a competent civil service-even though these two objectives at times may clash.
Similar to its impact on this specific area of government, social mobilization tends to generate also pressures for a more general transformation of the political elite. It tends to generate pressures for a broadening and partial transformation of elite functions, of elite recruitment, and of elite communications. On all these counts, the old elites of traditional chiefs, village headmen, and local notables are likely to prove ever more inadequate; and political leadership may tend to shift to the new political elite of party or quasi-party organizations, formal or informal, legal or illegal, but always led by the new "marginal men" who have been exposed more or less thoroughly to the impact of modern education and urban life.
Something similar applies to elite communications. The more broadly recruited elites must communicate among themselves, and they must do so more often impersonally and over greater distances. They must resort more often to writing and to paper work. At the same time they must direct a greater part of their communications output at the new political strata; this puts a premium on oratory and journalism, and on skill in the use of all mass media of communication. At the same time rapid social mobilization causes a critical problem in the communications intake of elites. It confronts them with the ever present risk of losing touch with the newly mobilized social strata which until recently still did not count in politics. Prime Minister Nehru's reluctance to take into account the strength and intensity of Mahratti sentiment in the language conflict of Bombay in the 1950s and his general tendency since the mid-1930s to underestimate the strength of communal and linguistic sentiment in India suggest the seriousness of this problem even for major democratic leaders.
The increasing numbers of the mobilized population, and the greater scope and urgency of their needs for political decisions and governmental services, tend to translate themselves, albeit with a time lag, into increased political participation. This may express itself informally through greater numbers of people taking part in crowds and riots, in meetings and demonstrations, in strikes and uprisings, or, less dramatically, as members of a growing audience for political communications, written or by radio, or finally as members of a growing host of organizations. While many of these organizations are ostensibly non-political, such as improvement societies, study circles, singing clubs, gymnastic societies, agricultural and commercial associations, fraternal orders, workmen's benefit societies, and the like, they nevertheless tend to acquire a political tinge, particularly in countries where more open outlets for political activities are not available. But even where there are established political parties and elections, a network of seemingly nonpolitical or marginally political organizations serves an important political function by providing a dependable social setting for the individuals who have been partly or wholly up-rooted or alienated from their traditional communities. Such organizations may serve at the same time as marshalling grounds for the entry of these persons into political life.
Where people have the right to vote, the effects of social mobilization are likely to be reflected in the electoral statistics. This process finds its expression both through a tendency towards a higher voting participation of those already enfranchised and through an extension of the franchise itself to additional groups of the population. Often the increase in participation amongst those who already have the right to vote precedes the enfranchisement of new classes of voters, particularly in countries where the broadening of the franchise is occurring gradually. Thus in Norway between 1830 and 1860, voting participation remained near the level of about 10 per cent of the adult male population; in the 1870s and 1880s this participation rose rapidly among the enfranchised voters, followed by extensions of the franchise, until by the year 1900, 40 per cent of the Norwegian men were actually voting. This process was accompanied by a transformation of Norwegian politics, the rise to power of the radical peasant party Venstre, and a shift from the earlier acceptance of the existing Swedish-Norwegian Union to rising demands for full Norwegian independence.9 These political changes had been preceded or accompanied by a rise in several of the usual indicators of social mobilization among the Norwegian people.
Another aspect of the process of social mobilization is the shift of emphasis away from the parochialism and internationalism of many traditional cultures to a preoccupation with the supralocal but far less than worldwide unit of the territorial, and eventually national, state.
An among those which referred to America or to the colonies as a whole, rather than among those referring to particular colonies or sections."0 MVore recent experiences in some of the "development countries" also suggest a more rapid rise of attention devoted to national topics than of that given to world affairs, on the one hand, and to purely local matters, on the other. This, however, is at present largely an impression. The nature and extent of attention shifts in mass media, as well as in popular attitudes, in the course of social mobilization is a matter for research that should be as promising as it is needed."t Some data on the flow of domestic and foreign mails point in a similar direction. Of five development countries for which data are readily available the ratio of domestic to foreign mail rose substantially in four-Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and Turkey-from 1913 to 1946-51; the fifth, Indonesia, was an exception but was the scene of internal unrest and protracted warfare against the Dutch during much of the latter period. According to some data from another recent study, a further side effect of social mobilization and economic development might possibly be first a substantial expansion, and then a lesser but significant reduction, relevant strata. The same process increases the frequency and the critical importance of direct communications between government and governed. It thus necessarily increases the importance of the language, the media, and the channels through which these communications are carried on.
Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life. By the same token, social mobilization may tend to promote the merging of several smaller states, or political units such as cantons, principalities, sultanates or tribal areas, whose populations already share substantially the same language, culture and social system; and it may tend to inhibit, or at least to make more difficult, the merging of states or political units whose populations or ruling personnel differ substantially in regard to any of these matters. Social mobilization may thus assist to some extent in the consolidation of the United Arab Republic, but raise increasing problems for the politics and administration of multilingual India-problems which the federal government of India may have to meet or overcome by a series of creative adjustments."4
In the last analysis, however, the problem of the scale of states goes beyond the effects of language, culture, or institutions, important as all these are. In the period of rapid social mobilization, the acceptable scale of a political unit will tend to depend eventually upon its performance. If a government fails to meet the increasing burdens put upon it by the process of social mobilization, a growing proportion of the population is likely to become alienated and disaffected from the state, even if the same language, culture and basic social institutions were shared originally throughout the entire state territory by rulers and ruled alike. The secession of the United States and of Ireland from the British Empire, and of the Netherlands and of Switzerland from the German Empire may serve in part as examples. At bottom, the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilization is most of all a matter of its capabilities and the manner in which they are used---that is, essentially a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its population. If it proves persistently incapable or unresponsive, some or many of its subjects will cease to identify themselves with it psychologically; it will be reduced to ruling by force where it can no longer rule by display, example and persuasion; and if political alternatives to it appear, it will be replaced eventually by other political units, larger or smaller in extent, which at least promise to respond more effectively to the needs and expectations of their peoples.
In practice the results of social mobilization often have tended to increase the size of the state, well beyond the old tribal areas, petty principalities, or similar districts of the traditional era, while increasing the direct contact between government and governed far beyond the levels of the sociologically superficial and often half-shadowy empire of the past.
This growth in the size of modern states, capable of coping with the results of social mobilization, is counteracted and eventually inhibited, however, as their size increases, by their tendency to increasing preoccupation with their own internal affairs. There is considerable evidence for this trend toward a selflimitation in the growth of states through a decline in the attention, resources and responsiveness available for coping with the implicit needs and explicit messages of the next marginal unit of population and territory on the verge of being included in the expanding state.15
The remarks in this section may have sufficed to illustrate, though by no means to' exhaust, the significance of the process of social mobilization in the economic and political development of countries. the constituent subprocesses of social mobilization may have been going on? Although specific data will have to be found separately for each country, it should be possible to sketch a general quantitative model to show some of the interrelations and their possible significance.
III. A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF THE SOCIAL MOBILIZATION PROCESS
For a quantitative description, it is convenient to express our first six indicators not in terms of the total percentage of the population which is literate, or exposed to modern life, etc., but in terms only of that average annual percentage of the total population which has been added to, or subtracted from, the total share of the population in that category. If for some country our indicator showed, say, 40 per cent exposed to significant aspects of modern life in 1940, and 60 per cent so exposed in 1950, the average annual percentage shift, dmi1 would be 2 per cent. The seventh indicator, per capita increase, may be broken up into two elements and written as the annual percentage of the total income added, dM7 and the annual percentage of population growth, p.
Adopting these conventions, we may use in this model, for purposes of illustration, crudely estimated magnitudes from various collections of data. If we add indicators for the increase in voting participation, and in linguistic, cultural or political assimilation, we may write for a case of fairly rapid social mobilization a small table of the sort shown in Table I . The case represented by this table is an imaginary one, but the different rates of subprocesses of social mobilization are not necessarily unrealistic, and neither are the consequences suggested by this model, for the stability of the government in any country to which these or similar assumptions would apply.
Before discussing these consequences more explicitly, it should be made clear that the annual rates of change are likely to be realistic, at most, only for countries during the rapid middle stages of the process of social mobilization and economic development-say, for a range of between 10 and 80 per cent literacy and for analogous ranges of other indicators of economic development. In the earliest stages, the annual percentages of the population shifting into a more mobilized state are apt to be much smaller, and in the late stages of the process something like a "ceiling effect" may be expected to appear-once 80 or 90 per cent of the population have become literate, any further annual gains in the percentage of literates in the population are likely to be small. Within the middle stages of development, however, which are appropriate to the assumptions of the model, a cumulative strain on political stability may be expected. All the rates of change in group I tend to make for increased demands or burdens upon the government, and all of them have median values above 1 per cent per year. The rates of change in group II are related to the capabilities of the government for coping with these burdens, but the median values of all these rates, with only one exception, are well below 1 per cent. If it were not for this exception-the assumed 5 per cent annual increase in national income-one would have to predict from the model an annual shift of perhaps 1 per cent or more of the population into the category of at least partly socially mobilized but largely unassimilated and dissatisfied people.
If one assumes, in accordance with this model, an annual entry of 2.75 per cent of the population into the mass media audience and a shift of only 0.6 per cent into non-agricultural employment, then the expectable increase in the numbers of not adequately reemployed new members of the mass media audience might be as high as 2.15 per cent of the population per year, or more than one-fifth of the population within a decade. This might be the proportion of people newly participating in their imagination in the new opportunities and attractions of modern life, while still being denied most or all of these new opportunities in fact-something which should be a fairly effective prescription for accumulating political trouble. The spread of more effective methods of production and perhaps of improved patterns of land tenure, rural credit, and other betterments within the agricultural sector could do something to counteract this tendency; but short of major and sustained efforts at such agricultural improvements the danger-.ous gap between the fast-growing mass media audience and the slow-growing circle of more adequately employed and equipped persons is likely to remain and to increase.
If linguistic, cultural or political assimilation-that is, the more or less permanent change of stable habits of language, culture, legitimacy and loyalty-is also a relevant problem in the country concerned, then the lag of the slow assimilation rate, put at only 0.25 per cent per year in our model, behind the far more rapid mobilization rates of 0.5 to 3.0 per cent for the various subprocesses in our model, might be even larger for some of them, and potentially more serious. Table I , and their persistence over twenty years. As can be seen from Table II , the cumulative effects of these changes from 1950 to 1960 will appear still moderate, but by 1970 these effects will have become so great that many of the political institutions and practices of 1950 might be no longer applicable to the new conditions. As Table II shows, a major transformation of the underlying political and social structure of a country could occur-and could pose a potential threat to the stability of any insufficiently reform-minded government thereeven during a period of substantially rising per capita income.
To be sure, many of these political and social difficulties could be assuaged with the help of the benefits potentially available through the 5 per cent increase in total national income, which was assumed for our model. Such a 5 per cent growth rate of total income is not necessarily unrealistic. It is close to the average of 5.3 per cent, found by Paul Studenski in a recent survey of data from a large number of non-Communist countries.' Since the rate of population growth, assumed for the model, was 2.6 per cent-which is well above the world average in recent years-the average per capita income might be expected to rise by slightly more than 2 per cent per year." These additional amounts of available income might well go at least some part of the way to meet the new popular needs and expectations aroused by the mobilization process, if the income can be devoted to consumption and price levels remain stable. But any increments of income will also be needed for savings (in addition to loans and grants from abroad) to permit a high rate of investment and an adequate rate of expansion of opportunities for education, employment and consumption for the growing numbers of the mobilized population.
These beneficial consequences could only be expected, however, if we assume that an adequate share of the increase in income would go directly or indirectly to the newly mobilized groups and strata of the population. nately, no assumption of this kind would be realistic for many of the developing countries of Asia and Africa.
It would be far more realistic to assume that in most of these countries the top 10 per cent of income receivers are getting about 50 per cent of the total national income, if not more. If we assume further, as seems not implausible, that in the absence of specific social reforms the increase in income will be distributed among the various strata of the population roughly in proportion to the present share of each group in the total national income, then we may expect that the richest 10 per cent of the people will get about 50 per cent of the additional income produced by income growth. At the same time, since these richest 10 per cent are not likely to be much more fertile than the rest of the population, they are likely to get only 10 per cent of the population increase; and they will, therefore, on the average not only get richer in absolute terms, but they will also retain the full extent of their relative lead over the rest of the population; and so they will increase in absolute terms the gap in income that separates them from the mass of their countrymen. Under the same assumptions, however, we should expect that the poorest nine-tenths of the population will get only one-tenth of the total income gain, but that they will get up to nine-tenths of the entire population growth; and that on the average these poorest 90 per cent of the people will remain in relative terms as far below the level of the rich one-tenth as ever. The fact that the poorer majority will have become slightly richer in absolute terms may then in the main increase their awareness of the wide gap between their living standards and those of their rulers; and it might at the same time increase their ability to take political action.
Differently put, if for the entire country the average per capita income was assumed to rise, we must now add that under the assumptions stated, the "social gap"-the gap between the incomes of the poorest 90 per cent and those of the top 10 per cent-may well be expected to increase. Political stability, however, may well be more affected by changes in the income gap than by changes in the average which in this respect might be little more than a statistical abstraction. Our model would lead us to expect, therefore, on the whole the danger of a significant deterioration of political stability in any development country to which its assumptions might apply. Since these assumptions were chosen with an eye to making them parallel, as far as possible, to the more rapid among the actual rates found in countries of this type, the expectations of rising political tensions in countries undergoing rapid social mobilization may not be unrealistic.
To rely upon automatic developments in economic and political life in those countries of the Free World to which the assumptions of our model apply, would be to court mounting instability, the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by no less unstable successors, or else their eventual absorption into the Communist bloc. Deliberate political and economic intervention into the social mobilization process, on the other hand, might open up some more hopeful perspectives. Such intervention should not aim at retarding economic and social development, in the manner of the policies of the regime of Prince Metternich in Austria during much of the first half of the 19th century. Those policies of slowing down social mobilization and economic development in the main only diminished the capabilities of the government, paved the way to domestic failures and international defeats and were followed over the course of three generations by the persistent backwardness and ultimate destruction of the state. A more promising policy might have to be, on the contrary, one of active intervention in favor of more rapid and more balanced growth; a somewhat more even distribution of income, related more closely to rewards for productive contributions rather than for status and inheritance; the more productive investment of available resources; and a sustained growth in the political and administrative capabilities of government'and of ever wider strata of the population.
The crude model outlined above may have some modest usefulness in surveying and presenting in quantitative terms some of the magnitudes and rates of change that would be relevant for understanding the basic problems of such a more constructive policy in developing countries.18 Somewhat as the economic models of the late Lord Keynes drew attention to the need of keeping the national rates of spending and investment in a country in bal-18 For other highly relevant approaches to these problems, see Almond and Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, esp. the discussion by Almond on pp. 58-64. The problem of rates of change and their acceleration is discussed explicitly by Coleman, ibid., pp. 536-558. While this work presented extensive data on levels of development, it did not take the further step of using explicit quantitative rates of change, which would be needed for the type of dynamic and probabilistic models that seem implicit in the long-range predictions of the authors, as set forth on pp. 58-64, 535-544.
ance with the national propensity to save, so it may become possible some day for political scientists to suggest in what areas, in what respects, and to what extent the efforts of government will have to be kept abreast of the burdens generated by the processes of social mobilization. The first steps toward this distant goal might be taken through research which would replace the hypothetical figures of the model by actual data from specific countries, so that the model could be tested, revised, and advanced nearer toward application.
Any cooperation which social scientists and other students of cultural, political, and economic development and change could extend to this effort-by improving the design of the model or by suggesting more precise or refined definitions of some of its categories, or by furnishing specific data-would be very much appreciated. For certain categories-such as voting participation, immigration and internal migration, linguistic and cultural assimilation, and the inequality of income distribution-not enough data were readily available to permit even the simple type of tabulation presented here. Even for the data that we have collected, the gaps in such countries as Ghana, Nigeria and Congo illustrate the need for more research.
Moreover, the data being presented on the basis of the figures that appear in United Nations publications and similar sources make no attempt to estimate the margins of error to which they may be subject, or the differences in significance which a particular indicator of social mobilization may have in the cultural context of certain countries, in contrast with its significance in others. The high literacy rates reported for Burma and Thailand, e.g., include a substantial proportion of literates trained through traditional monastic institutions. These rates show only a weak correlation to other indicators of modernity for those same countries, while the high literacy rates for Chile by contrast, refer to the effect of a more modern type of school system and are far better correlated to other indicators.
We have tried to take some account of these matters by basing estimates of over-all exposure to modernity not on the highest single indicator but on the average of the two highest indicators for each country, so as to discount to some extent the effects of any single indicator that seems too far out of line with the rest. Despite these precautions, the figures in projection offered here represent at best a crude beginning intended to stimulate far more thorough and critical statistical work, and its critical evaluation by experts on each of the countries and areas concerned.
For discussion of specific data and sources, see the Notes following the tables. * In each box of Column 9, the first figure is based on the levels in Table III These averages are entirely based on data of Table IV-A. * Data for pre-partition India were used only once in calculating the average. # GDP =gross domestic product. t In Column 9, in each box, the first figure is the average of shifts based on highest levels, the second figure is the average of shifts based on largest shifts, and the third figure is the average of the first two. (See Table IV-A and Notes to Table IV , 1957, mimeographed) . Column 5. Only the circulation of daily newspapers has been considered, even though various kinds of periodicals, such as illustrated weeklies and monthlies of general interest, may enjoy greater popularity than newspapers in many countries. Also, popular illustrated magazines may reach isolated and hard-to-reach places more readily than daily newspapers are likely to. Total exposure to the press is thus somewhat understated.
It was found feasible to give figures for only one year; this column does not therefore appear in the following tables. Source. The United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1960, pp. 206f., gives the estimated number of daily newspaper copies per 1000 of population. The Yearbook defines a daily newspaper "for the purposes of this table as a publication containing general news and appearing at least four times a week." It points out: "In interpreting the data, it should be borne in mind that in different countries the size of a daily newspaper may range from a single sheet to 50 or even more pages." Column 6. Comparable international statistics on literacy are still difficult to obtain. In their enumerations, countries differ with respect to the age group of the population to be considered and to the definition of literacy or illiteracy. Not only do countries differ among each other, but a country may change definitions from one census to another. Most sources used for this column endeavor to give literacy (or illiteracy) figures based on defining literates as persons able to read and write. The degree of this ability may again vary from country to country (see UNESCO, Progress of Literacy in Various Countries, Paris, 1953). An attempt has been made to find or compute data in such a way that the same age limits apply to both years for each country; exceptions are duly indicated. The data in such exceptional cases are still deemed valid for our purposes. In 15 cases in which corresponding calculations have been made, the difference between the percentages of literates in the population of 10 years of age and over and that in the population of 15 years of age and over averages 0.9% and ranges from 0.1% to 2.6%. For the purposes of this analysis, these magnitudes are negligible, particularly regarding average shifts per year. Column 6. The high literacy rates reported for such countries as Burma and Thailand include to a large, though diminishing, extent men who have received traditional training in Buddhist monasteries and are not necessarily involved in the process of social mobilization.
Several sources used for this column give percentage of illiterates. To find the percentage of literates, the former was subtracted from 100%. In some cases, this method may count a small percentage of "unknowns" as literate, and thus very slightly overstate the number of literates. Definitions of "urban" vary widely from country to country, but an attempt has been made to see that the definition remained the same for both dates used in calculations for each country. For Chile, this was not possible. In 1940, "urban" included cities and towns of 1000 or more inhabitants and administrative centers of less than 1000 population. In 1952, the definition was population centers which had definite urban characteristics contributed by certain public and municipal services. It would seem, however, that these two definitions are close enough for our purposes.
A higher 1950 urban population (almost 54%) is given for Venezuela in UN Report, 1957, p. 172; if we had used it, it would have made the mobilization rates for Venezuela still somewhat higher.
NOTES TO TABLE III-B
To be in a better position to compare the available data all indices of social mobilization (Columns 4 and 5-8) have been adjusted to the same two years (1945 and 1955) , by applying the annual average shifts of Table IV-A to the corresponding levels given in  Table III -A. It is thereby assumed that shifts did not change significantly over the relevant years. While most of the adjustments involve only a few years, the risk of possible slight distortions had to be taken in cases in which a longer period was involved.
As we have only one level for newspaper readers, Column 5 does not appear in this table.
Column 9. The persons exposed to modernity are those who have in one way or another come into contact with aspects of modern life. Since hardly enough surveys in this respect have been made in the countries under consideration, the percentage of the population exposed to modernity must be estimated indirectly. It is initially assumed for the purpose of this table that (1) exposure to modernity includes any one of our indices (Columns 4-8) in addition to other, more informal exposures such as markets, travel, rumor, etc.; (2) the sector of the population in a smaller percentage index is entirely included in the sector of a higher percentage so that the exposed population groups form concentric circles-e.g., all of the newspaper readers would be exposed to radio, and all of the radio listeners would be literate, but that some literates would not listen to radio, etc., (3) the largest sector is that exposed to any form of modernity, and (4) 20% of the population exposed to modernity are unaccounted for in Columns 4 to 8, because the groups indicated there do not overlap completely, and because of less formal ways of exposure. As has been pointed out in the introduction to this Appendix, however, in order to discount to some extent the effects of any single indicator that seems too far out of line with the rest, the procedure followed to estimate the percentage of the population exposed to modernity has been to increase the average of the two highest of the indices for each country and year by 25 per cent. This method reduces the impact of a single indicator with weak correlation to other indicators to such a degree that the percentage of persons exposed to modernity appears to be smaller than that of some other population sector in cases in which the correlation of single index is extremely weak (cf. Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Burma).
In actual fact, we have good reason to suppose that these assumptions understate in general the total extent of exposure. It is quite likely that some of the population sectors overlap only to a lesser degree. This can particularly be expected in countries with balanced low levels of social mobilization.
Calculated percentages exceeding 95% are assumed to behave differently. They are merely listed as being over 95%.
